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I. INTRODUCTION
The recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court concerning the
Guantanamo Bay detainees1 and the application of capital punishment to
minors2 have instigated renewed debate about the appropriateness of using
international law or transnational legal developments as guidance in
* Professor, Department of Business Law and Taxation, Monash University, Melbourne,
Victoria, Australia; Special Counsel, McCullough Robertson, Lawyers, Brisbane, Queensland,
Australia.
1. Hamdi v. Rumsfield, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Rumsfield v.
Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
2. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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determining domestic United States law. Various Justices of the United
States Supreme Court have in recent years indicated that they are not
completely receptive to the use of international material in determining
domestic law;4 however, a consideration of cases from the British
Commonwealth concerning the extent of the territorial application of the
writ of habeas corpus as assistance in determining whether the writ should
apply to non-United States citizens detained in Guantanamo Bay5 and
reference to international opinion relating to the imposition of capital
punishment on juveniles6 may indicate that transnationalism is having a
growing influence in United States jurisprudence.7
It is ironic that the United States, historically viewed as the most
innovative of the common law countries, is perceived as one of the least
receptive to growing international judicial discourse: its practice has been
described as exhibiting "a distinct lack of institutional enthusiasm" in this
regard. 8 By contrast, the Canadian Supreme Court and the High Court of
Australia are regarded, at least by academic writers, as being quite receptive
to consideration of international legal material.9 The practices of the High
3. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law and Globalization, 43
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 485 (2005); Paul Schiff Berman, Judges as Cosmopolitan Transnational
Actors, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 109 (2004); Harold Hongju Koh, The Supreme Court Meets
International Law, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1 (2004).
4. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n. Il (1997) (stating that "such comparative
analysis [is] inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution"); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990
(1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (expressing similar views).
5. In Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), Justice Scalia referred to cases from the British
Commonwealth concerning the extent of the territorial application of the writ of habeas corpus. Id.
at 555-58 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also John R. Crook, General International and U.S. Foreign
Relations Law: United States Lifts Some Sanctions on Libya, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 253, 261 (2005).
6. In Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005), international opinion relating to the imposition
of capital punishment on juveniles was referred to by the majority opinion of Justice Kennedy, in
which Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsberg and Breyer joined. Id. at 1199.
7. See generally Koh, supra note 3. Koh suggests a tension between the nationalists and
transnationalists on the Supreme Court:
On the current U.S. Supreme Court, I would argue, there are now four Justices who are
direct heirs to the transnationalist tradition: Stephen G. Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
John Paul Stevens, and Justice David Souter. At the same time, there are three Justices
who are firmly nationalist in their orientation: Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and
Chief Justice William Rehnquist. Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Anthony Kennedy
represent the swing votes. And if 2004 proved to be a pivotal year, it was because the
swing voters, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, cast their lot with the transnationalist
faction of the Supreme Court, thereby bringing the Court into the modern international
era.
Id. at 6; see also Eric A. Posner, Transnational Legal Process and the Supreme Court's 2003-2004
Term: Some Skeptical Observations, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 23 (2004).
8. See Sarah Harding, Comparative Reasoning and Judicial Review, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 409,
439 (2003).
9. See Rebecca Lefler, Note, A Comparison of Comparisons: Use of Foreign Case Law as
Persuasive Authority by the United States Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of Canada, and the
High Court of Australia, 11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 165 (2001); Jens C. Dammann, The Role of
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Court of Australia and the Supreme Court of Canada, in contrast to that of
the United States Supreme Court, have been cited as examples of how using
foreign case authority can help to develop national jurisprudence. ° This
Article considers whether the perceptions of an increasing transnational
attitude by the High Court of Australia can be established by empirical
evidence. It then addresses the perceived benefits of this approach for
Australia.
In order to determine whether a transnationalist attitude on the High
Court of Australia could be substantiated by empirical evidence, this Article
revisits a citation analysis of the High Court of Australia's use of United
States authority undertaken by the author in 1987. That study, published in
1992 in the Adelaide Law Review, 1 attempted to document the influence of
United States jurisprudence upon legal developments in Australia as a result
of unique historical factors, primarily the use of the United States
Constitution as a precedent for Australia's federal system. The study
observed a number of trends attributable to these historical factors (restated
below), but it also identified an emerging trend which was then attributed to
a new willingness of the Australian High Court to consider broader sources
of judicial reasoning. The review, modification and updating the original
study undertaken in this article attempts to confirm that emerging trend
observed in the original study by considering an additional sixteen years of
evidence.
Citation analysis, as employed herein, has been used in a number of
contexts to provide objective evidence; often to demonstrate, support or
explain conclusions or valuations which themselves may be quite subjective.
For example, the statistical analysis of voting patterns within particular
courts has been used to explore issues such as the political biases and
judicial attitudes of the justices who sit on that court.' 2 Similarly, citation
Comparative Law in Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 513
(2002).
10. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 (1997); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999)
(Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari); see also Harding, supra note 8, at 410 n.4, 417;
David S. Clark, The Use of Comparative Law by American Courts, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 23 (1994);
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L. L. 1103 (2000); Mark Tushnet, The
Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225 (1999).
II. Paul E von Nessen, The Use of American Precedents by the High Court of Australia, 1901-
1987, 14 ADEL. L. REv. 181 (1992). The original study was updated to October 2002. The
description of the methodology, the control samples from 1987 (reproduced infra note 54 and Part
IV), and certain of the initial conclusions reported in this paper are derivative from that article, and
are reproduced here with permission.
12. See, e.g., GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND: ATTITUDES AND IDEOLOGIES OF THE
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 1946-1963 (1965); GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND
REVISITED: PSYCHOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT IDEOLOGY (1974); Jerry K. Beatty,
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analysis has been used to assess the influence of particular justices, 13 of law
reviews and other academic writings, 14 and of particular law review
articles.' 5 Citation analysis has also been used to reveal whether there is a
Decision-Making on the Iowa Supreme Court -1965-1969, 19 DRAKE L. REV. 342 (1970); Joseph
A. Custer, Citation Practices of the Kansas Supreme Court and Kansas Court of Appeals, 8 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 126 (1999); Daryl Fair, An Experimental Application of Scalogram Analysis to
State Supreme Court Decisions, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 449 (1967); William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249 (1976); James
Leonard, Ideology and Judicial Behavior: A Statistical Study of the Ohio Supreme Court: 1970,
1975, 1980 and 1985 Terms, 57 U. CiN. L. REV. 935 (1989); William H. Manz, The Citation
Practices of the New York Court of Appeals 1850-1993, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 121 (1995); William H.
Manz, The Citation Practices of the New York Court of Appeals: A Millennium Update, 49 BUFF. L.
REV. 1273 (2001); John Henry Merryman, The Authority ofAuthority: What the California Supreme
Court Cited in 1950, 6 STAN. L. REV. 613 (1954) [hereinafter Merryman, Authority of Authority];
John Henry Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice
of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1977)
[hereinafter Merryman, Theory of Citations]; C. Herman Pritchett, Divisions of Opinion Among
Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, 1939-1941, 35 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 890 (1941); George Rose
Smith, The Current Opinions of the Supreme Court of Arkansas: A Study in Craftsmanship, 1 ARK.
L. REV. 89 (1947); Fritz Snyder, The Citation Practices of the Montana Supreme Court, 57 MONT L.
REV. 453 (1996); S Sidney Ulmer, Supreme Court Behavior and Civil Rights, WEST. POL. Q., Jun.
1960, at 288-311; Patrick Brown & William A. Haddad, Comment, Judicial Decision-Making on the
Florida Supreme Court: An Introductory Behavioral Study, 19 U. FLA. L. REV. 566 (1967); Eric
Scott Richards, Comment, The Supreme Court of Michigan During the Survey Period: A Statistical
Analysis, 32 WAYNE L. REV. 215 (1986).
13. See, e.g., Mita Bhattacharya & Russell Smyth, The Determinants of Judicial Prestige and
Influence: Some Empirical Evidence from the High Court of Australia, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 223
(2001); David Klein & Darby Morrisroe, The Prestige and Influence of Individual Judges on the
U.S. Courts of Appeals, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 371 (1999); Montgomery N. Kosma, Measuring the
Influence of Supreme Court Justices, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 333 (1998); William M. Landes, Lawrence
Lessig, & Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Influence? A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of
Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1998); Peter McCormick, The Supreme Court Cites the
Supreme Court: Follow-up Citation on the Supreme Court of Canada, 1989-1993, 33 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 453 (1995); Russell Smyth, Who Gets Cited: An Empirical Study of Judicial Prestige in
the High Court, 21 U. QUEENSL. L.J. 7 (2000); Russell Smyth, Judicial Prestige: A Citation Analysis
of Federal Court Judges, 6 DEAKIN L. REV. 120 (2001).
14. See, e.g., Vaughan Black & Nicholas Richter, Did She Mention My Name?: Citation of
Academic Authority by the Supreme Court of Canada, 1985-1990, 16 DALHOUSIE L.J. 377 (1993);
John J. Hasko, Persuasion in the Court: Non-Legal Materials in U.S. Supreme Court Opinions, 94
LAW LIBR. J. 427 (2002); Richard Kopf, Do Judges Read the Review? A Citation-Counting Study of
the Nebraska Law Review and the Nebraska Supreme Court, 1972-1996, 76 NEB. L. REV. 708
(1997); Michael D. McClintock, The Declining Use of Legal Scholarship by Courts: An Empirical
Study, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 659 (1998); Patricia McMahon, Canadian Judicial Citations of Articles
Published in the University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review, 59 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 367
(2001); lan Ramsay & G P Stapledon, A Citation Analysis ofAustralian Law Journals, 21 MELB. U.
L. REV. 676 (1997); Louis J. Sirico, Jr., The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: 1971-
1999, 75 IND. L. REV. 1009 (2000); Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Beth A. Drew, The Citing of Law Reviews
by the United States Court of Appeals: An Empirical Analysis, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1051 (1991);
Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Jeffrey B. Margulies, The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: An
Empirical Study, 34 UCLA L. REV. 131 (1986); Russell Smyth, Academic Writing and the Courts:
A Quantitative Study of the Influence of Legal and Non-legal Periodicals in the High Court, 17 U.
TAS. L. REV. 164 (1998); Russell Smyth, The Authority of Secondary Authority: A Quantitative
Study of Secondary Source Citations in the Federal Courts, 9 GRIFF. L. REV. 25 (2000).
15. See, e.g., Deborah Merritt & Melanie Putnam, Judges and Scholars: Do Courts and
Scholarly Journals Cite the Same Law Review Articles?, 71 CHI.- KENT L. REV. 871 (1996); Fred R.
Shapiro, The Most-Cited Articles from The Yale Law Journal, 100 YALE L.J. 1449 (1991); Fred R.
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significant variation in the frequency of citations by a particular court over
specified periods of time or in reference to specific areas of law.1 6
In addition to the extensive use of citation analysis to ascertain the
influence of justices, academic writers, law review articles, or particular
cases, 17 the observation and analysis of the influential effect that one court
has upon another has often been the subject of study. In federations such as
the United States, Canada, or Australia, such studies have been used in order
to identify which of the state or provincial courts have been cited more
frequently by other state or provincial courts. 18 Less common have been
studies which attempt to establish the influential effect of the judicial
opinions expressed by the courts of one nation upon the judicial attitudes
reflected in the courts of another.19
The wide acceptance of empirical analysis for such a broad range of
purposes, particularly since 1990, confirmed that updating the original study
would make a positive contribution to the debate about increased global
perspectives of the judiciary by providing evidence of changing patterns of
the use of foreign authority by the High Court of Australia. It was
anticipated that the review of the use of both federal and non-federal United
States authority (as occurred in the original study) would provide evidence
of an increased willingness of the High Court of Australia to consider
Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1540 (1985); Fred R. Shapiro, The
Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.- KENT L. REV. 751 (1996).
16. See, e.g., Merryman, Authority of Authority, supra note 12; Merryman, Theory of Citations,
supra note 12; Landes & Posner, supra note 12, at 251-52.
17. Robert Schriek, Most-Cited U.S Courts of Appeals Cases from 1932 Until the Late 1980s, 83
LAW LIBR. J .317 (1991).
18. The most notable American example of this is found in State Supreme Courts: A Century of
Style and Citation, in which a project analyzing the citation practice of various American state courts
included a study of the pattern of citations by these courts of the judgments of other states' courts.
Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 773, 799-808 (1981). Canadian studies include: Peter McCormick, The Evolution of
Coordinate Precedential Authority in Canada: Interprovincial Citations of Judicial Authority, 1922-
92, 32 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 271 (1994); Peter McCormick & Tammy Praskach, Judicial Citation,
the Supreme Court of Canada, and the Lower Courts: A Statistical Overview and the Influence of
Manitoba, 24 MAN. L.J. 335 (1996); Peter J. McCormick, Judicial Citation, the Supreme Court of
Canada, and the Lower Courts: The Case of Alberta, 34 ALTA. L. REV. 870 (1996). Australian
studies include: Russell Smyth, What Do Intermediate Appellate Courts Cite? A Quantitative Study
of the Citation Practice of Australian State Supreme Courts, 21 ADEL. L. REV. 51 (1999); Russell
Smyth, What Do Judges Cite? An Empirical Study of the 'Authority of Authority' in the Supreme
Court of Victoria, 25 MONASH U. L. REV. 29 (1999).
19. See, e.g., Uriel Gorney, American Precedent in the Supreme Court of Israel, 68 HARV. L.
REV. 1194 (1955); J.M. Maclntyre, The Use of American Cases in Canadian Courts, 2 U. B. C. L.
REV. 478 (1966); Peter McCormick, The Supreme Court of Canada and American Citations 1945-
1994: A Statistical Overview, 8 S. CT. L. REV. 2d 527 (1997).
foreign authority, despite the fact that the study was limited principally to
one (albeit a very large) sample of foreign authority.
II. AUSTRALIA'S HISTORICAL CONTEXT
In the common law systems of the world, the use of international
solutions as guidance to determine appropriate domestic judge-made law is
often difficult to reconcile with the theory and doctrine of precedent. The
concepts of precedent attempt to ensure that the development or application
of the common law proceeds in an efficient manner. For this reason, the
value of judicial precedent depends on the pronouncing court's position in
its judicial hierarchy. 20 Because foreign law and foreign judgments do not
always come from within a particular judicial hierarchy, the application of
such law (even by adopting the better reasoning within it) presents the
continuing tension of the common law that is faced by any judge who
accepts or prefers a judicial view that is unsupported by prior domestic
authority.2'
In the United States, the Supreme Court does not have general appellate
jurisdiction over non-federal matters determined by the state court
systems.22 In consequence of this, the courts of the various states in the
United States have been able to review external common law developments
(in other states as well as internationally) without any degree of
compulsion. 23 The effect which this has on the development of both the
common law and the judicial processes within each of the American states
has been quite dramatic, clearly distinguishing the common law
development in the United States from that in other common law countries.24
20. See JULIUS STONE, PRECEDENT AND LAW 197-218 (1985).
21. Id. at 186-192; see also RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986) (raising the interplay
between principles and rules).
22. See Merrell-Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 814 (1986) (holding that where
state law issues dominate, or there is no federal question present, federal courts generally do not
have jurisdiction).
23. Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall) 590 (1875). In this case, the U.S. Supreme
Court reviewed the statutory pronouncement of its appellate powers contained in the Judiciary Act of
1789, § 25, 1 Stat 73, amended by Judiciary Act of 1867, § 2, 14 Stat 385. It concluded, in relation
to matters arising under state law not involving a federal issue: "The State courts are the appropriate
tribunals, as this court has repeatedly held, for the decision of questions arising under this local law,
whether statutory or otherwise." Murdock, 87 U.S. at 626. See generally Michigan v. Long, 463
U.S. 1032 (1983); Note, The Untenable Nonfederal Ground in the Supreme Court, 74 HARV. L. REV.
1375 (1961).
24. See Harry W. Jones, Our Uncommon Common Law, 42 TENN. L. REV. 443, 455-56 (1975).
This is also reflected in the Supreme Court's decision in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938), requiring federal courts to resolve common law problems by application of local (state) law,
rather than general federal common law. See Edward C. Jones, Federal Judiciary Act, Stare Decisis,
Decisions of State Courts Other Than the Highest as Being Binding Precedents in Federal Courts,
15 S. CAL. L. REV. 71 (1941) (reviewing this issue and discussing the problems this has caused to
federal courts).
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Through the potential development of alternative common law principles,
the states of the United States have often presented alternative solutions to
resolve common law issues as they have developed.1
5
In addition to the experimental nature of the development of the
common law within the United States, the judiciary of each U.S. state has
had the opportunity to utilize standard techniques (the techniques of
comparative law) when determining whether or not to adopt common law
principles developed in other states. The comparative techniques used in the
consideration of foreign law (i.e., weighing the benefits and detriments of
alternative solutions, considering whether there is an alignment of the policy
objectives in relation to the alternative solutions, and considering possible
differentiating factors between local circumstances and those of the state in
which the solutions have been used) are applied implicitly but are not
recognized as comparative law at all:
[A]II Americans are comparativists to the extent that they consult
out-of-state authorities. As is often the case when practical needs
override scholarly interest (the rule of stare decisis being the most
interesting example), no one takes time to study, understand or
verbalize the activity of comparing. These activities (comparing
American jurisdictions, following legal precedents and so on)
become part of... the tacit knowledge, the obvious and routine
activities that do not commend nor require explanation.
Consequently, a preponderance of the scholarship published in this
country [the United States] by comparative lawyers is
methodologically unaware, simply applying the same exercise of
comparing one U.S. jurisdiction to another to multinational
jurisdictions.26
25. See, e.g., Keith A. Rowley, A Brief History of Anticipatory Repudiation in American
Contract Law, 69 U. CrN. L. REV. 565 (2001) (explaining the development of the concept of
anticipatory breach in the United States); see also Gregory S. Crespi, The Adequate Assurances
Doctrine After U.C.C. § 2-609: A Test of the Efficiency of the Common Law, 38 VILL. L. REV. 179
(1993); Dena DeNooyer, Comment, Remedying Anticipatory Repudiation-Past, Present, and
Future?, 52 SMU L. REv. 1787 (1999). Similar descriptions of the adoption by various states of the
principle of comparative negligence as an alternative to contributory negligence can be found in:
Mary Davis, The Scope of Individual and Institutional Responsibility: A Vision for Comparative
Fault in Products Liability, 39 VILL. L. REv. 281 (1994); Fleming James, Jr., Contributory
Negligence, 62 YALE L.J. 691 (1953); Wex S. Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory
Negligence, 41 ILL. L. REV. 151 (1946); Michael Steenson, Comparative Negligence in Minnesota,
9 WM. MITCH. L. REv. 299 (1983).
26. MICHAEL POLANYI, THE TACIT DIMENSION (1967), Ugo Mattei, An Opportunity Not to Be
Missed: The Future of Comparative Law in the United States, 46 AM. J. CoMp. L. 709, 717 (1998)
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In contrast to the legal circumstances of the United States, the judiciary
in the British Commonwealth, including Australia and Canada, has
historically been under both structural and cultural pressure to consider
common law developments from other common law countries (other than
the United States) as potentially applicable to them. 27 These pressures were
caused by the presence of the Privy Council at the common apex of the
judicial hierarchy of the British Commonwealth and by the acceptance that
the common law should, as far as practical, remain "common" throughout
the common law world (which in this context excluded the United States).28
The importance of the Privy Council as a unifying factor in the British
common law sphere was, until recently, unquestioned. While local variants
of the common law (on the basis of peculiar local circumstances) existed, the
case of Bakhshuwen v. Bakhshuwen indicated that a determination by the
Privy Council of a point of common law would generally be binding
authority upon all courts over which it was the ultimate appellate court.29
For that reason, the common law throughout the British Empire was subject
to a similar unifying influence, such as is exercised by the United States
Supreme Court in relation to the various United States Circuit Courts of
Appeals.
In addition to the constraint that the Privy Council represented as the
ultimate court of appeal, there was also an acknowledgement throughout the
British Commonwealth that common law development should ideally
proceed in a similar fashion throughout the world. The Privy Council itself
had stressed the importance of maintaining such uniformity in the nineteenth
century case of Trimble v Hill: "[I]t is of the utmost importance that in all
parts of the Empire where English law prevails, the interpretation of that law
by the Courts should be as nearly as possible the same."3°
(citing DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SIECLE) 78 (1997)); Rodolfo
Sacco, Mute Law, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 455 (1995)).
27. The use of foreign authority by common law courts (with particular reference to those of the
British Commonwealth) has been considered in: T. Koopmans, Comparative Law and the Courts, 45
INT'L. & COMP. L.Q. 545 (1996); Thomas Allen & Bruce Anderson, The Use of Comparative Law
by Common Law Judges, 23 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 435 (1994); B.S. Markesinis, Judge, Jurist and the
Study and Use of Foreign Law, 109 LAW Q. REV. 622 (1993); H. Patrick Glenn, Persuasive
Authority, 32 MCGILL L.J. 261 (1987).
28. While reference to United States authority by the Courts of other common law countries may
be useful, the differences between United States law and legal culture and that of the remainder of
the common law world have tended to inhibit the use of United States authority. Typical of the
attitude to United States law generally is the oft-quoted cautionary view expressed by Sir Anthony
Mason, former Chief Justice of the Australian High Court:
American case law is a trackless jungle in which only the most intrepid and discerning
Australian lawyers should venture. It is possible to find American authority to support
almost any conceivable proposition of law .... It is essential therefore to use American
authority with care and discrimination.
Sir Anthony Mason, The Use and Abuse of Precedent, 4 AUSTL. BAR REV. 93, 108-109 (1988).
29. [1952] A.C. 1 (P.C. 1952) (appeal taken from Eastern Africa).
30. 5 App. Cas. 342, 345 (P.C. 1879).
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Similar views were also expressed by the courts of other countries, with
a prime example being the view expressed in Waghorn v. Waghorn." In this
case, the High Court of Australia indicated its willingness not only to defer
to the views of the Privy Council, but also to the views of other English
Courts.3 2 The High Court in Waghorn decided to follow the views of the
English Court of Appeal, in preference to its own prior decision, on a matter
of statutory interpretation concerning a similar statute.33 This was justified
by reference to the desire for uniformity:
The common law is administered in many jurisdictions, and unless
each of them guards against needless divergences of decision its
uniform development is imperiled. Statutes based upon a common
policy and expressed in the same or similar forms ought not to be
given different operations. In this court some trouble has been
taken to preserve consistency of decision, not only with English
courts, but also with those of Canada and New Zealand. English
courts cannot be expected to receive the decisions of the Dominions
with the traditional respect which the courts of the Dominions pay
to the decisions of the English courts, but it is disappointing to find
that, upon the particular question with which we are concerned, the
Court of Appeal did not take an opportunity of considering the
34judgment delivered by this court ....
In Piro v. W. Foster & Co. Ltd.,3 Chief Justice Latham, after reiterating
the binding nature of Privy Council decisions on the High Court of
Australia, confirmed the regard to be given to the English House of Lords by
Australian courts inferior to the High Court:
In quest of uniformity I considered in Waghorn v Waghorn that we
should yield to a decision of the English Court of Appeal rather than
follow a decision of our own Court. Technically we are bound only
by the judgments of the Privy Council, but I have no doubt that we
should follow all rulings of the House of Lords on points of law
common to both countries. I agree that, in the absence of any ruling
of this Court, the learned Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
New South Wales... was right in considering that he was bound by
31. (1942) 65 C.L.R. 289.
32. Seeid.at291.
33. Id.
34. (1942) 65 C.L.R. 289, 297-98.
35. (1943) 68 C.L.R. 313, 325-26.
a decision of the High Court as the ultimate court of appeal for
Australia subject to an appeal to the Privy Council. But for the
future, in order to prevent circuity of action, it is advisable for us to
direct that Australian courts should follow all rulings of the House
of Lords and of course the Privy Council in preference to those of
this Court.
3 6
With the elimination of appeals from Canada (in 1949) 37 and Australia
(in 1986)38 to the Privy Council, the structural constraints in both countries
have enabled greater recourse to developments in foreign jurisdictions as
guidance to the proper evolution of Canadian and Australian law. The
application of foreign law by judges of the common law systems outside the
United States39 is consequently perceived to be an increasing phenomenon,
one worthy of observation and measurement.
III. DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDY METHODOLOGY
In order to measure empirically the acceptance of international judicial
authority by the High Court of Australia, a sample of foreign opinions cited
by the High Court of Australia had to be identified and quantified.
Unmeasured anecdotal observations indicated that United States judicial
authority was used commonly enough by the High Court of Australia to
provide a sample of sufficient size to make an analysis likely to reveal both
36. Id.
37. See The Supreme Court Act, R.S., 1952, c. 259, section 54(l)-(2), An Act respecting the
Supreme Court of Canada (stating that "[t]he Supreme Court shall have, hold and exercise exclusive
ultimate appellate civil and criminal jurisdiction within and for Canada; and the judgment of the
Court shall, in all cases, be final and conclusive."). Footnote I of this Act explains that section 54 of
this 1952 Act incorporates chapter 37, section (3) of the Statutes of 1949 that granted the Supreme
Court of Canada the "exclusive ultimate appellate civil and criminal jurisdiction within and for
Canada .. " Id. at n. 1.
38. See Privy Council (Limitation of Appeals) Act 1968, No. 36 (Austl.). This is an act that
limits the matters in which Special Leave of Appeal from the High Court of Australia to Her Majesty
in Council can be obtained. See also Privy Council (Appeals from the High Court) Act 1975, No. 33
(Austl.) (furthering the limitations of matters in which "special leave of appeal from the High Court
of Australia to Her Majesty in Council may be asked"); Australia (Request and Consent) Act 1985,
No. 143 (Austl.) (granting the request to the United Kingdom by the Parliament and Government of
the Commonwealth of Australia to terminate appeals "to Her Majesty in Council"); Australia Act
1986, c.2, page 5, § 11 (U.K.) (stating that "no appeal to Her Majesty in Council lies or shall be
brought, whether by leave or special leave of any court or of Her Majesty in Council or
otherwise... from or in respect of any decision of an Australian court."). Finally, see the equivalent
request Acts of each Australian State, as each of the States had to pass an act along the same lines as
the Commonwealth (mirror legislation), otherwise the United Kingdom would not act.
39. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997) (stating that "comparative analysis
[is] inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution"); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999)
(Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (expressing similar views). This attitude is not
universally held, however. See Harding, supra note 8, at 410 nn.3-4. See generally Clark, supra note
10; Slaughter, supra note 10 (discussing the role of comparative law in the American legal system);
Tushnet, supra note 10 (same).
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significant trends and patterns of use possible. With the original choice of
the United States for the study in 1987, the unique position of the United
States vis-A-vis the remainder of the common law world (including
Australia) made it an attractive selection as a sample for consideration. As a
country with a legal system with origins in the English common law, the
United States would have a heritage of legal concepts well known elsewhere
in the common law world, but being completely autonomous of English
control for two centuries, courts in the United States would have been able
to resolve legal issues and develop legal principals in ways which could
provide a useful contrast to the orthodox development found elsewhere in
the common law world.
For the continuation of the study on the High Court of Australia's use of
international judicial authority through the end of the twentieth century,
United States authority remained a natural choice as a sample for the same
reasons it was originally selected. This decision was further justified by the
United States' emergence in the latter half of the twentieth century as the
leading commercial and political power in the world. The study of the High
Court's use of United States judicial authority enables a consideration of the
High Court's practices in order to establish whether there are identifiable
historical trends or patterns of use of authority based upon objective
evidence. Once developed, this evidence could shed light upon the
processes by which the legal culture of Australia has been affected by
international developments such as those arising from within the United
States.4 °
In its initial stages, the empirical study undertaken evolved through a
process of trial and error. However, the methodology, once refined, was
applied as consistently as possible throughout the study. When the study
first commenced, there were no full text electronic databases with the
judgments of the Australian High Court.4 1 Consequently, to ascertain the
extent to which the judiciary of the High Court of Australia relied upon
American judicial pronouncements, a physical review of the judgments of
the Australian High Court from 1901 to 199042 as reported in the
40. The High Court of Australia has referred to judgments originating from a number of
countries, including many not conventionally considered by common law judges. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Yarmirr (2000) 208 C.L.R. 1, 20-21 (citing judgments from Canada, New
Zealand, and Sweden, along with other United Nations authority). In contrast to the frequent use of
United States judgments observed in the study, these were not considered statistically significant
enough to warrant specific identification and analysis.
41. Presently, however, there is a full-text electronic database with such judgments. See The
Australian Legal Information Institute, http://www.austlii.edu.au/.
42. Begun in 1987, the study was updated in 2000 by use of the original methodology to 1990,
with the total for the decade 1981-1990 included in this report.
Commonwealth Law Reports was undertaken. The methodology used,
which is described more fully in the original Adelaide Law Review
publication,43 required the manual searching of each volume for references
to decisions of United States courts. 44 Each reference to a United States
(state or federal) case report which was identified in the Commonwealth
Law Reports was listed according to the page where it appeared in the
Commonwealth Law Reports. 45 During the initial listing, the topic area for
which the case was considered relevant and the name of the Justice who had
referred to the case were noted.46
In quantifying the use of United States authority, a relatively basic
method of identifying and counting case references was employed. In order
to minimize discretionary bias in this process, no distinction was made
between a case name citation and reference to a case that indicated how the
case was perceived (either positively or negatively) by the Australian
judiciary. Although this method of data collection undoubtedly lacked
sophistication, it nevertheless served to identify the number of times that the
judiciary of the High Court considered the American perspective relevant at
all.47 Whether American authorities, once considered by an Australian
43. See von Nessen, supra note 11, at 187-93.
44. American cases referred to in each volume of the Commonwealth Law Reports (through
volume 64) were identified by reviewing the table of cases cited in each volume for references to
American case report series. The incidents of such citations at that particular page were noted and
catalogued by reference to the Commonwealth Law Report page number indicated in the table of
cases cited. Because such cases were normally included in the table of cases cited with reference
only to the first page of each High Court case upon which they appeared, subsequent pages of each
Australian case were reviewed for repeat references to identified United States cases. This technique
had to be abandoned for volumes 65 forward of the Commonwealth Law Reports because from that
volume, the table of cases contained only name references (rather than full citations). As a result,
cases from the United States in later volumes were identified by the painstaking task of reviewing
each page of the Commonwealth Law Reports. All cases referred to in the Commonwealth Law
Reports are given their full citation in a separate footnote each time mentioned, easing the task of
identifying American cases greatly. For the period 1987 to 2002, an equivalent process was done by
use of a computer search. To assure comparability the computer identification method was
undertaken for earlier volumes on a test basis, with no significant variation from the original, manual
searches found.
45. This process, though somewhat inexact, was applied consistently throughout the survey. All
references, no matter how brief, were noted. On the other hand, repeated references to the same case
within close proximity were identified as only one reference. Thus, the mentioning of a particular
case followed by a brief extract from the case was identified as only one reference. Where a repeat
of a reference occurred at a significant interval from the original citation, the repeat reference was
also noted.
46. The methodology and purview of the original study evolved slightly from its origin. While
the list included the citing Justice in the original data collection, no analysis of that was undertaken.
As a result, the later supplementation of the original study did not list the particular Justice making
use of the United States judgment. References to American decisions which appeared in the
Commonwealth Law Reports, but outside of the actual judgments (such as in briefs of counsel and
questions from the bench) were also initially identified. Since these references were not a subject of
analysis, they were not noted in later data collection.
47. American authority is merely persuasive in Australian courts, and may, of course, be totally
disregarded. However, the American perspective is often considered relevant because of both its
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justice, were followed or rejected would undoubtedly be a matter of interest.
Due to possible ambiguities which could arise in making that judgment,
however, these characterizations were not attempted.48
After the initial data collection, the total references found within the
Commonwealth Law Reports were summarized, initially by volume and
then by year of judgment. This data was then further analyzed, comparing
the number of High Court citations of United States cases in each year or
decade.49  Increasing judicial output since the inception of the
Commonwealth Law Reports in 1901 (partially due to the change through
the years in the use of joint judgments) was considered; however, as
discussed below, these were not considered to be material to the study
findings.50
In addition to an analysis of the total incidence of usage of cases from
the United States, the area of law for which such cases were used was also
considered. Both selecting and defining the categories into which the cases
were to be sorted provided certain challenges which revealed themselves as
the data collection commenced. The categories which were eventually used
(the original reasons for their selection and their description are more fully
described in the original study)5' were selected to facilitate a useful analysis
throughout the century, allowing for the possibility of legal development
which was unanticipated at the commencement of the process. As a
consequence, five relatively specific areas--constitutional law, public law,
contracts and commercial law, tort law, and criminal law-were
supplemented by three more generic classifications: other common law
areas, other statutory areas, or miscellaneous other legal areas. Determining
the limits of each classification itself provided some complexity. For
example, certain matters such as individual rights and freedoms are dealt
with in the United States Constitution, but are generally not considered in
shared common law heritage with Australia and the Australian Constitution's modeling after certain
provisions in the American Constitution. See discussion infra note 53 and accompanying text.
48. Since cases from the United States are not strictly authoritative in Australia, references to
such cases can be used without any need to indicate whether they should be followed, rejected, or
modified. See discussion infra note 53 and accompanying text. Consequently, there frequently is no
direct judicial statement indicating what is thought of such cases.
49. The cases were classified based upon the date of the judgment rather than the date of the
volume.
50. See infra notes 54, 58; see also Edward McWhinney, Judicial Concurrences and Dissents: A
Comparative View of Opinion-writing in Final Appellate Tribunal, 31 CAN. B. REv. 595, 595-625
(1953) (comparing the practice of the Privy Council in relation to joint and individual judgments
with those of the final courts of appeal of Australia, South Africa, India, Ireland, Canada, and the
United States).
51. See von Nessen, supra note 11, at 187-193.
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the Australian Constitution.52 Such matters were resolved by identifying a
classification which would make some sense in both jurisdictions. The
following descriptions indicate why the five specific areas were chosen and
how the descriptions were applied.
A. Constitutional Law
Selection of constitutional law as a topic was the most obvious of
choices due to the fact that the United States Constitution served as a model
for the federal aspects of the Australian Constitution.53 The data collection
immediately revealed this to be an appropriate choice, as resolution of issues
concerning the division of powers in the new Australian federation provided
ample opportunities for consideration of United States authority, particularly
in the first decade of federation. Since this classification was intended to be
appropriate in both jurisdictions, the cases dealing with the United States
Bill of Rights and matters inappropriate to a parliamentary form of
government were not considered as constitutional cases unless they were
used in relation to an Australian Constitutional equivalent. Matters of
constitutional interpretation were also included in this category, providing
some flexibility for new developments.
B. Public Law
Due to the initial determination that matters would be included as
constitutional only if so considered in both Australia and the United States,
public law provided a natural category for issues concerning the proper
functioning of government not covered in both constitutions. Administrative
law and the relationship among the branches of government, such as
statutory interpretation, were categorized as public law.
C. Contracts and Related Commercial Law
Because both the United States and Australia are common law
jurisdictions, contract and related commercial law were selected as an
appropriate category for consideration. Included within this category were
cases concerning contract law and other related areas, such as agency.
Banking, insurance and aspects of partnership law were also included.
52. Australia Constitution Act, 1900, 63 & 64 Vict., c. 12 (U.K.).
53. R. v. Kirby (1956) 94 C.L.R 254, 275 ("Probably the most striking achievement of the
framers of the Australian instrument of government was the successful combination of the British
system of parliamentary government containing an executive responsible to the legislature with
American federalism"); see also ERLING M. HUNT, AMERICAN PRECEDENTS IN AUSTRALIAN
FEDERATION (1930); J01HN QUICK & ROBERT GARRAN, ANNOTATED CONSTITUTION OF THE
AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH (1901).
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D. Tort Law
Tort law as a category was relatively easy to define, including within its
parameters negligent torts, intentional torts and closely related incidental
issues. Although these matters rarely involve international aspects, it is a
legal area where policy considerations prevail. It was thus considered as a
topic where international perspectives might be considered.
E. Criminal Law
This classification (as with that of torts) was also fairly straightforward
in its description. Many of the American Bill of Rights cases dealing with
criminal procedural issues-self-incrimination, search and seizure, and
double jeopardy-were included in this category.
To ensure that all cases would be captured by the analysis, the
remaining cases were classified into one of the following three more generic
categories.
F. Other Common Law Areas
This included areas of law historically developed through the judicial
process even though statutory interventions of significance may have
occurred in Australia or the United States. Property law, equity (including
fiduciary duties of partners, agents, and directors), evidence, and family law
were included in this area.
G. Statutory Areas
This topic area included legal principles primarily originating with
statutes, and included insolvency regulation, corporate law, intellectual
property, taxation, and trade practices (antitrust).
H. Miscellaneous Others
Predominant in this group of cases, originally selected as a generic
catch-all, were international law, maritime law, and labor law. This
classification also provided a mechanism by which newly developing areas
of law could be classified.
During the twentieth century, the High Court of Australia experienced
significant changes in its practice and output, the same way other courts did
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over such a period. In view of the changes in both workload and output,5 4 it
was necessary to consider whether these matters would be likely to
undermine the validity of any observations comparing citations in various
parts of the twentieth century. Despite the variations noted, these were not
considered material to the findings of this study in relation to the mix of
topic areas in which the High Court's use of American authority was
found.55 As with the original study, where this Article presents the total
incidents by decade, it is without adjustment for increase in workload or
output. Such increased output of the High Court would, consequently, be a
54. A test study performed in the original 1987 study considering the reported decisions of the
High Court during the period is reproduced below:
Decade Volumes Sample Pa/Vol CasesNol Pg/Case
1901-1910 10 1 - 9* 851.6 46.7 18.2
1911-1920 19 10-28 671.6
1921-1930 15 30-39 598.2 33.1 18.1
1931-1940 21 46-55 680.5
1941-1950 18 72-81 652.9 28.3 23.1
1951-1960 22 85-94 654.3
1961-1970 19.5 85-94 655.1 32.1 20.0
1971-1980 22.5 125-46 675.9
1981-1987 18 154-64 685.5 25.0 27.42
*Includes volumes 4 (pt. 1) and 4 (pt. 2) as two volumes.
Two counterbalancing trends were identified in relation to the practice of the High Court during the
period of the study: the number of judgments selected for publication in the Commonwealth Law
Reports from each decade had decreased while the length of each judgment reported therein had
increased in size. When the total pages required per decade were estimated by multiplying the
volumes for each decade by the sample average pages per volume, a more precise comparison of the
page volume for each decade's reported judgments was estimated:
Decade Total Pages Comparison to Avg.* Over (under) Avg.*
1901-1910 8,516 69.1% (30.9%)
1911-1920 12,760 103.5 3.5
1921-1930 8,973 72.8 (27.2)
1931-1940 14,290 115.9 15.9
1941-1950 11,752 95.3 (4.7)
1951-1960 14,388 116.7 16.7
1961-1970 12,774 103.6 3.7
1971-1980 15,207 123.3 23.3
1981-1987 12,339 100.0 (7 yrs.) 42.9
*Average calculated without inclusion of 1980-1987 period.
The 1980s appear to show a marked increase in the total output of pages reported by the High Court,
with the first seven years requiring as many pages (12,339) as the average number of pages for each
already completed decade (12,333). For a more complete description of this issue, see generally
Friedman et al., supra note 18, at 799-808; Jean Louis Goutal, Characteristics of Judicial Style in
France, Britain, and the U.S.A., 24 Am. J. COMP. L. 43 (1976); von Nessen, supra note 11, at 192.
55. This aspect of the study's findings is unaffected by population size. In relation to the total
number of citations per decade, the increased output would partially explain any increase noted, but
not any decrease noted.
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contributing factor in relation to increased use of United States cases in later
decades.
IV. DATA SUMMARY OF ORIGINAL HIGH COURT STUDY
A summary of the data derived during this project
through 1990)56 is included as Table 1, which lists the





























































































The data represented in Table 1 reveals two important aspects of the
Australian use of United States authority during the period 1900-1990, each
of which was identified as relevant in the original study findings: (1)
constitutional law and theory predominated in the type of United States
authority considered by the High Court during the entire period; and (2) The
Australian High Court's use of cases from the United States varied
significantly both in volume and in topic area during that part of the century
covered by the original study. Within this second finding were two
subsidiary observations: (1) The volume of citations was significantly higher
in the periods 1900-1910 and 1971-1990; and (2) The relative predomination
of Constitutional issues in the early decades was replaced in later years with
a broadening range of legal areas.
56. The original study's totals ended with volume 164 of the C.L.R. These totals were
supplemented with the addition of citations from volumes 165 to 172 (using the same methodology
as the original study), representing 317 additional citations in 38 different cases. These consisted of
constitutional law (142), public law (32), commercial law (1), tort law (none), criminal law (38),
common law (79), statutory law (25) and miscellaneous (none).
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While the observations noted above are illustrated in Table 1, these
findings are made more graphic by reference to the following charts
comparing the High Court use of United States authority both by decade and
by topic area of reference.
Graph 1, below, represents the subject matter distribution of the data for
the entire period of 1901-1990. As expected, constitutional law cases
represented the largest portion (54.7%) of all of the references to United
States judicial authority by the High Court during the first ninety years of
Australian nationhood. Aggregating the closely related topic area of public
law brings the total to nearly two-thirds of all citations (63.5%). By
contrast, common law (15.6%) is the only other topic with more than 6% of
the total population.
Graph 1
American Citations by High Court 1901-1990









Misc. (65) 1.7% 8.8%
The second observation the study revealed concerned the periods during
which the citation of United States authority was popular. Graph 2, below,
indicates the number of High Court citations of United States authority per
annum for each of the first nine decades of the twentieth century. The two
decades in which reference to United States cases were most common were
the periods 1901-1910 (56.5 citations to United States authority per annum)
and 1981-1990 (109.6 citations to United States authority per annum). The
graph dramatically indicates the steady decline in the use of United States
citations from a high point immediately after Australian federation to the
low point in the 1960s (with a mere 19.0 United States citations per year).
Although a slight increase was observed for the period 1971-1980, the most
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dramatic increase occurred in the period 1981-1990 (109.6 references to
United States authority per year).
Graph 2








1901 1911 1921 1931 1941 1951 1961 1971 1981
While the trend represented in the above graph is extremely pronounced,
at least some portion of that increase is arguably attributable to changes in
the High Court's workload and total output during the century. As
reported in the original study, even after converting a reference per page
basis to adjust for the variance in the output of the High Court in total page
volume from one decade to another, the essential nature of the trend
remains, with the differential between the first and last decades reduced
significantly.58 Nevertheless, even as thus adjusted, citations in the first
decade of the original study (66.3 references per 1,000 pages in the
Commonwealth Law Reports) and the last decade of the study (63.1
references per 1,000 pages in the Commonwealth Law Reports) are
significantly greater than any other decade, and nearly four times the
57. See supra note 54.
58. Id. After adjusting for differences in the total page volume, the data (citations per 1,000
pages in the Commonwealth Law Reports) would indicate the following trend:
Decade Citations In Decade* 1000 C.L.R. Pages
1901-1910 565 8,156 66.3
1911-1920 474 12,760 37.1
1921-1930 273 8,973 30.4
1931-1940 269 14,290 18.8
1941-1950 366 11,752 31.1
1951-1960 296 14,388 20.6
1961-1970 190 12,774 14.9
1971-1980 329 15,207 21.6
1981-1987 779 12,339 63.1
*As estimated id.
See also von Nessen, supra note 11, at 197 n.31 (discussing the trend in further detail).
measurement at the low point in the 1960s (14.9 references per 1,000 pages
in the Commonwealth Law Reports).
Finally, the original study revealed not only a significant variance in the
use of United States authority by the High Court from decade to decade but
also significant variation in the subject matter mix of such use. Graph 3
demonstrates the number of citations in each decade distributed by topic
area:
Graph 3
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As might be expected with a new federation, the proportion of
constitutional law cases is extremely high in the first two decades after its
commencement. This high representation of constitutional law authority
decreased relatively steadily after the first decade (with a brief surge
between 1930 and 1940). Conversely, the proportion of United States
citations in relation to all of the other legal categories increased after 1910.
The concentration of cases concerning constitutional law in the first
decade and the greater mix of cases referred to by the High Court in the last
decade of the original study are illustrated in Graph 459 and Graph 5, below.
Contrasting these two decades, the percentage of constitutional law cases
referred to by the High Court dropped from 71.5% (1901-1910) to 33.7%
(1981-1990) of the United States cases cited by the High Court during those
decades.
59. Similar graphic illustrations are also provided in von Nessen, supra note 11, at 200-01. With
the exception of Graph 4, each of the Graphs in this article has been modified to account for the
elimination of the extrapolation of findings for the period 1981-1990 which were reported in the
original study. See von Nessen, supra note 11, at 195-201. Graph 4 represents only the 1901-19 10
decade and has been unaltered, except in presentation, from the original. See id. at 200.
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The data collected on the Australian High Court's use of United States
authority during its first nine decades of nationhood is informative not only
in relation to positive observations. The distinct lack of any use of authority
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from the United States in relation to some legal areas is in itself worthy of
comment. The study revealed some use of United States authority in the
areas of commercial law, tort law, and criminal law, but significantly less
use in the areas of law with a substantial legislative basis, such as evidence
and civil procedure. The lack of cases concerning legislative-based legal
areas is indicative of the fact that during this period, there were few pieces of
Australian legislation directly copied from the United States.60 Another
factor that would contribute to the lack of Australian reference to United
States cases interpreting statutes is the fundamentally different approach
taken in the United States and Australia to statutory interpretation prior to
1981. 61  The change in the interpretive technique employed in Australia,
mandated by legislative enactment in 1981, might also explain an increase in
the incidents of case references to statutory based areas of law since that
time. 62
Perhaps the most significant, and least surprising, of the observations
from the original study concerns the use of the United States cases in
assisting to interpret the Australian Constitution in the High Court's first ten
years. Since the United States Constitution served as a model for parts of
the Australian Constitution,63 it is not surprising that the High Court sought
to benefit not only from established techniques for interpreting a written
constitution, but also from United States doctrine as an aid to interpreting the
purpose and intent of particular Australian provisions.64 The great variation
60. The use of United States legislative models is rare, but increasing in frequency since the
completion of the original study. See, e.g., Paul von Nessen, The Americanization of Australian
Corporate Law, 26 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 239, 239 (1999) (noting that Australian corporate
law was becoming much more similar to American law); Paul von Nessen, Corporate Governance
in Australia: Converging with International Developments, 15 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 189, 190 (2003)
(noting that "practices in Australia continue to converge in an international context with those
adopted in other countries, particularly with those of other common law countries such as the United
States and the United Kingdom."). The first significant piece of Australian legislation copied from
the United States was the Trade Practices Act 1974. See Bob Baxt, The Trade Practices Act 1974,
62 LAW INST. J. 1191, 1191 (1988); STEPHEN G. CORONES, COMPETITION LAW IN AUSTRALIA 37
(3d ed. 2004).
61. See von Nessen, supra note 11, at 202. The statutory construction techniques in Australia
prior to 1981 relied predominantly upon construction from the text of the statute itself. Id. Sections
15AA and 15AB of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Austl.), passed in 1981, indicate that
legislative interpretation should promote the purpose or object underlying an Act, and that extrinsic
evidence could be used in ascertaining what construction should be placed upon a statute. See Acts
Interpretation Act 1901, §§ 15AA-AB (Austl.), available at
http://scaletext.law.gov.au/html/pasteact/l/606/0/PA000300.htm. This enactment consequently
brought Australian statutory interpretive techniques into alignment with long held practice in the
United States. See Chaffee v. San Francisco Pub. Library Comm'n, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 4 (Ct. App.
2005) (stating that when statutes in the United States are susceptible to more than one interpretation
courts should look to extrinsic aids).
62. See discussion infra note 71 and accompanying text.
63. See sources cited supra note 53.
64. A comparison of the Australian High Court's practice to that of other non-American judicial
tribunals was also undertaken in 1987 in order to assure that any trends identified would be properly
attributed to circumstances peculiar to Australia's High Court rather than to any factors equally
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in the use of such authority in later decades, however, warrants closer
consideration.
V. EXPLANATIONS FOR THE TRENDS REVEALED IN THE ORIGINAL STUDY
Although the observation and description of trends revealed by a study
such as that originally undertaken primarily requires consistency and
accuracy in the recording of data, drawing conclusions from the observations
recorded necessitates analytical skills clearly subjective in nature. At the
time of the original observations of the High Court of Australia's changing
practice in its use of American case authority,65 several hypotheses were
proposed as providing the explanations for the various trends observed.
Reviewing those explanations with the hindsight of fifteen years reinforces
those conclusions in some instances, but it also provides the opportunity for
further questioning whether the hypotheses proposed should now be
reconsidered.
The data collected through 1990 reveals several things about the High
Court of Australia's use of United States case authority. The most apparent
observation is that throughout the first ninety years of its existence, the High
Court of Australia referred to United States authority in the area of
constitutional law (and the related area of public law) far more frequently
than any other area of law. The simplest explanation of this observation is
that the Australian Constitution is modeled upon the United States
Constitution, and consequently the High Court would necessarily find
assistance by considering the views of the United States Supreme Court on
applicable to such other tribunals. During this period, the New Zealand Supreme Court and Court of
Appeal were found to refer to American decisions less than ten times per year. The Australian High
Court's use, by contrast, was nearly three times that frequency. The control study of the Canadian
Supreme Court during the twentieth century, on the other hand, revealed significant references to
American case authority, with a notable increase after the acceptance by Canada of the Charter of
Rights (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of The Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.). See von Nessen, supra note 11, at 207-09; see
also Stephen B. Nelson, Canadian Use ofAmerican Precedent Under the New Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, 3 CAN.-AM. L.J. 161 (1986); Peter Hogg, The Charter of Rights and American Theories
of Interpretation, 25 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 88 (1987). A comparison of the two sample years
confirmed the increase as result of that factor with United States cases being used approximately ten
times more after the Charter than before. As might be expected, further analysis confirmed that
around three quarters of the United States cases were referred to in Canadian cases concerning the
Charter of Rights. These control observations support the conclusion that any trends observed in the
practice of the Australian High Court are attributable to factors which are particular to Australia
rather than to any broader explanation.
65. The extrapolation of the findings for the period 1981-1990 have been replaced by actual
observations as indicated. See discussion supra note 56 and accompanying text. This change
accentuates the trends observed for that decade and, to some extent, confirms the desire for the
further observations undertaken below.
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the constitutional issues that both nations shared.66 Even prior to this study,
the use made by the High Court of United States authority in relation to
particular provisions of the Australian Constitution had warranted
comment. Similarly, international commentators have also noted such use
of United States authority by the courts of selected other countries whose
constitutions have common elements with that of the United States.68
Concentrating upon the presence of relatively high number of cases
dealing with constitutional issues, however, obscures the complementary
observation that during this period, there were very few references by the
High Court to United States authority concerning contract law, tort law,
property law, or statutory law. In relation to the common law based areas of
the law, the adherence to orthodox principles and authority could be
explained by the fact that during most of the period of observation, the
Australian High Court itself could not diverge too far from the English view,
lest an appeal to the Privy Council69 put such adventurism to an end.7° On
66. The reasons for this have been discussed in numerous articles and books, and the
explanations for reliance upon United States authority vary depending upon the particular thesis to
be supported. Of most recent interest has been the relationship between the interpretation of the
United States Constitution and the acceptance of such interpretation as part of the original intent of
the Australian framers. See, e.g., BRIAN GALLIGAN, POLITICS OF THE HIGH COURT: A STUDY OF
THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT IN AUSTRALIA (1987); Gregg Craven, Original Intent and
the Australian Constitution-Coming Soon to a Court Near You?, I PUBL. L. REV. 166 (1990); Brian
Galligan, Realistic "Realism" and the High Court's Political Role, 18 FED. L. REV. 40 (1989);
Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The High Court, Implied Rights and Constitutional Change, 39 QUADRANT 46
(1995); Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Interpreting the Constitution in its Second Century, 24 MELB. U.L.
REV 677 (2000); Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation, 25 FED. L. REV.
1 (1997); Justice Michael Kirby, Constitutional Interpretation and Original Intent: A Form of
Ancestor Worship?, 24 MELB. U.L. REV. 1 (2000); Jeremy Kirk, Constitutional Interpretation and a
Theory of Evolutionary Originalism, 27 FED. L. REV. 323 (1999); David Lyons, Original Intent and
Legal Interpretation, 24 AUSTL. J. LEG. PHIL. 1 (1999); Dan Meagher, New Day Rising? Non-
Originalism, Justice Kirby and Section 80 of the Constitution, 24 SYD. L. REV. 141 (2002); Haig
Patapan, The Dead Hand of the Founders? Original Intent and the Constitutional Protection of
Rights and Freedoms in Australia, 25 FED. L. REV. 211 (1997); David Tucker, Textualism: An
Australian Evaluation of the Debate Between Professor Ronald Dworkin and Justice Antonin Scalia,
21 SYD. L. REV. 567 (1991).
67. See Julius Stone, A Government of Law and Yet of Men Being a Survey of Half a Century of
the Australian Commerce Power, 25 N.Y.U. L. REV. 451 (1950) (considering the High Court's
practice of using United States authority in interpreting the Australian Constitution's frequently
litigated commerce clause found in section 92).
68. See supra note 66. Interestingly, the absence of the reverse (United States Supreme Court
consideration of other countries' authority with similar constitutional provisions) is also noteworthy.
69. See Judicial Committee Act, 1833, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 41, § 3 (Eng.); Judicial Committee Act,
1844, 7 & 8 Vict., c. 69, § 2 (Eng.).
70. The conventional rule of precedent is that "every court is bound to follow any case decided
by a court above it in the hierarchy." RUPERT CROSS, PRECEDENTS IN ENGLISH LAW 6 (2d ed.
1968). This would mean that a decision of the Privy Council would be followed by all jurisdictions
with an appeal to that court. See Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for Canada,
[1947] A.C. 127, 145; Hall & Co. v. McKenna, [1926] IR 402, 404 (discussing the origin and role of
the Privy Council); P.G. McHugh, The Appeal of "Local Circumstances " to the Privy Council, 1987
N.Z. L.J. 24, 25-26 (1987) (same); Andre Tunc, The Not So Common Law of England and the United
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the other hand, the lack of consideration of United States authority in
relation to statutory based areas of law throughout the period could be
explained by several factors. First, Australia had not used United States
legislative models for its own legislation to any extent prior to the mid-
1970s, and consequently, cases from the United States would be of little
assistance to Australia in interpreting a precise statutory equivalent. Second,
Australia, like much of the common law world and unlike the United States,
construed legislation strictly and without reference to extraneous material
prior to 1981.71 Finally, the judiciary in the United States was required to
consider a broader range of constitutional provisions (including a Bill of
Rights with no direct equivalent in Australia) when ascertaining whether a
statutory provision might be constitutionally invalid.72 Each of these factors
meant that throughout most of the period of the study, United States
jurisprudence relating to the interpretation of statutes was of limited value in
Australia.
Further conclusions arising from the study's observations concern the
variation in the mix of cases from decade to decade, which are somewhat
more complex to explain. The first observation concerning the temporal
variation of High Court usage indicates that constitutional law cases were
most commonly considered by the High Court in the first and second decade
after federation, with a significant reduction continuing until the period of
1981-1990 (when the incidents of citation of all types of cases increased).
One plausible explanation of this trend is that the High Court used United
States authority as a starting point for the development of its own
constitutional jurisprudence, but discontinued referring to United States
cases as the years proceeded, preferring instead to cite its own judgments in
succeeding years. This explanation, however, would only be valid if it were
common practice to desist from referring to a United States case despite
continuing to agree with the principle espoused by it, because a more recent
States, or, Precedent in England and the United States, A Field Study by an Outsider, 47 MOD. L.
REv. 150 (1984) (same).
71. See Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Austl.) §§ 15AA, 15AB; see also discussion supra note 61
and accompanying text (discussing statutory construction techniques in Australia). The narrow
constructionist view which led to the change in the Acts Interpretation Act is discussed in Geoffrey
Lehmann, The Income Tax Judgments of Sir Garfield Barwick: A Study in the Failure of the New
Legalism, 9 MONASH U.L. REv. 115 (1983).
72. See D.J. Galligan, Judicial Review and Democratic Principles: Two Theories, 57 AUSTL. L.J.
69, 69-70 (1983); Jesse H. Choper, Consequences of Supreme Court Decisions Upholding Individual
Constitutional Rights, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1, 14-209 (1984) (discussing how the Supreme Court has
interpreted constitutional rights); Sanford Kadish, Judicial Review in the High Court and the United
States Supreme Court, 2 MELB. U. L. REv. 4, 4-5 (1959-60); The Honorable Mr. Justice F.C.
Hutley, The Legal Traditions ofAustralia as Contrasted with Those of the United States, 55 AUSTL.
L.J. 63, 66 (1981).
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Australian case had already indicated that the principle had been accepted (a
practice which would be rather novel in the common law). Given the
number of issues which might arise in constitutional litigation even after a
number of years, the shift to the use of established Australian precedents
would not seem to account for such a sudden reduction in the use of United
States cases.
An alternative hypothesis to explain the reduction in constitutional cases
(and one more suited to the sudden change observed) is that United States
constitutional jurisprudence was no longer seen by the justices of the High
Court as providing appropriate guidance. As originally noted in the 1987
study, this explanation is consistent both with the development of Australian
constitutional jurisprudence and with the changes in United States
constitutional jurisprudence causing it to diverge significantly for much of
the period of the study from the prevalent views in Australia concerning
constitutional interpretation.
Initially, many of the Justices of the High Court (including a number
actually involved in the drafting of the Australian Constitution) preferred to
embark upon interpretation of a written constitution with guidance from the
United States Supreme Court, a tribunal with over a century's experience in
that process. In 1920, however, the High Court acknowledged in
Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Company73 that
the interpretive techniques should reflect the legal culture from which
Australia had arisen, and that the interpretation of the Australian
Constitution, an Act of the Westminster Parliament, was more appropriately
interpreted by English interpretive techniques:
But we conceive that American authorities, however illustrious the
tribunals may be, are not a secure basis on which to build
fundamentally with respect to our own Constitution. While in
secondary and subsidiary matters they may, and sometimes do,
afford considerable light and assistance, they cannot, for reasons we
are about to state, be recognised as standards whereby to measure
the respective rights of the Commonwealth and the States under the
Australian Constitution.7 4
In addition to the reassertion of the fundamental British rather than
American nature of Australian legal culture, Engineers perhaps also turned
away from United States authority for a far less theoretical reason. At the
time of Engineers, the United States constitutional jurisprudence did not
support the view of the Federal/State balance of powers favored by the High
73. (1920)28 C.L.R. 129.
74. Id. at 146 (joint judgments of Knox, C.J., & Isaacs, Rich & Starke, J.J.). See also
McWhinney, supra note 50, at 603.
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Court Justices then in the majority.75 It is interesting to note, however, that
the Australian High Court exhibited a degree of frustration from time to time
with the imperial constraints under which it was required to act. 6
A second factor which would have made United States constitutional
jurisprudence less attractive to the Australian judiciary for much of the study
period was the abandonment by the United States Supreme Court of a
narrow construction of the commerce clause to allow the pursuit of New
Deal reforms during the Great Depression. 7  Having adopted an
interpretation of the much-litigated Australian commerce clause consistent
with United States cases increasingly questioned in the United States itself,
the Australian High Court, wishing to continue with its own views, was
faced with the uncomfortable choice of either using United States authority
discredited in its home country or failing to refer to United States authority
on this point at all. This, along with the decision in Engineers, would
explain a significant reduction in the use of United States constitutional
cases beginning in the 1920s and continuing through the middle of the
twentieth century.
The final observation concerning the use of United States authority
through the initial study period is that there was a marked increase in the use
of United States authority in the full range of topic areas in the final decade
of the study. The most likely cause for such a significant development is
one which itself is of great importance, and the changes to the role of the
Australian High Court that occurred between 1975 and 1985 provide a likely
explanation of the trend observed.
Prior to 1975, the High Court of Australia was the ultimate Australian
appellate court, serving not only as an arbiter of constitutional and federal
issues like the United States Supreme Court, but also serving as a general
appellate court charged with the responsibility of hearing appeals from the
state supreme courts on an unlimited range of matters, including those
arising from both common law and state statutes. With a prevailing attitude
throughout the British-dominated common law world being to retain as
uniform a development of the common law as possible,7 8 the right of appeal
75. See D.J. GALLIGAN, POLITICS OF THE HIGH COURT: A STUDY OF THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF
GOVERNMENT IN AUSTRALIA 101 (1987).
76. See, e.g., Parker v. The Queen (1963) 111 C.L.R. 610, 632 (judgment of Dixon, C.J.);
Skelton v. Collins (1966) 156 C.L.R. 94, 134 (judgment of Windeyer, J.).
77. See, e.g., Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937);
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
78. See Sir Victor Windeyer, Unity, Disunity and Harmony in the Common Law, 1966 N.Z. L.J.
193 (1966); see also P.S. Atiyah, Common Law and Statute Law, 48 MOD. L. REv. 1, 1 (1985); Sir
Robin Cooke, Divergences-England, Australia, and New Zealand, 1983 N.Z. L.J. 297, 297 (1983);
David Jackson, The Judicial Commonwealth, 28 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 257, 258 (1970). In relation to the
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to the Privy Council had continued under the Australian Constitution section
74 from the supreme courts of the new Australian states and from the High
Court of Australia on matters aside from those which dealt with "the limits
inter se of the Constitutional powers of the Commonwealth and those of any
State or States."
79
The elimination of appeals from the Australian High Court to the Privy
Council occurred in two stages. First, the Privy Council (Limitations of
Appeals) Act 1968 indicated that appeals to the Privy Council from the High
Court should not be permitted where the decisions involved the
interpretation or application of the Constitution, any law made by
Parliament, or any regulation or by-law made thereunder.8 ° Seven years
later, the initial elimination of the Privy Council's appellate jurisdiction
affected by the 1968 Act was extended by elimination of all appeals from the
High Court to the Privy Council by the Privy Council (Appeals from the
High Court) Act 1975.81 From then forward, appeals could not be taken
from the High Court to the Privy Council on any matter.82
Despite the elimination of appeals from the High Court to the Privy
Council, the development of Australian law continued without constraining
influence through 1986, as appeals from the Australian state supreme courts
on state issues continued. 83 The anomalous situation concerning both the
existence of two appellate courts and the precedential effect of Privy Council
decisions upon the High Court itself was described in Viro v. The Queen in
the following terms:
The effect of these legislative changes is extraordinary and perhaps
unprecedented. It is that from the Supreme Courts of the Australian
States, when not exercising federal jurisdiction, there are two final
courts of appeal, neither of which is subordinate to the other. There
is no doubt that the decisions of the Privy Council remain binding
on the courts of the States. The question is whether they remain
binding on this Court. A further question that arises is what course
should be taken by the Supreme Court of a State in the event that a
United States, see Herbert Pope, The English Common Law in the United States, 24 HARV. L. REV. 6
(1910).
79. Australian Constitution § 74.
80. Sir A.F. Mason, The Limitation of Appeals to the Privy Council From the High Court of
Australia, from Federal Courts Other Than the High Court, From the Supreme Courts of the
Territories and from Courts Exercising Federal Jurisdiction, 3 FED. L. REV. 1, 16 (1968)
[hereinafter Mason, The Limitation ofAppeals].
81. High Court of Australia: About the Court, http://www.heourt.gov.au/about_02.html (last
visited Jan. 20, 2006).
82. Id.
83. Id. Appeals on federal issues were eliminated by amendment to s. 39(2) of the Judiciary Act
(Austl.) in 1968.
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decision of this Court is in conflict with a decision of the Privy
Council.84
In 1986, the difficulties caused by having two ultimate courts of appeal
were eliminated with the Australia Act 1986 (U.K.), the Australia (Request
and Consent) Act 1985 (Austl.), and similar state acts that saw the final
elimination of appeals to the Privy Council. Under section 11(1) of the
Australia Act:
Subject to subsection (4) below [transitional provisions], no appeal
to Her Majesty in Council lies or shall be brought, whether by leave
or special leave of any court or of Her Majesty in Council or
otherwise, and whether by virtue of any Act of the Parliament of the
United Kingdom, the Royal Prerogative or otherwise, from or in
respect of any decision of an Australian court.85
In consequence of these developments, the High Court became the only
ultimate court of appeal for all Australian courts as of 1986. These changes
meant that the High Court could exercise greater independence and,
consequently, broaden its judicial perspectives.86 It was hypothesized at the
time of the completion of the original study that the more frequent and wider
use of United States judicial authority by the High Court reflected both the
structural change to the Australian Court hierarchy described above and the
84. Viro v. The Queen (1978) 141 C.L.R. 88, 120. This case deals directly with the relationship
between the Privy Council and the Australian High Court between 1975 and 1986, providing
guidance to the lower courts on how to deal with conflict of authority between the High Court and
the Privy Council. See Robert S. Geddes, The Authority of Privy Council Decisions in Australian
Courts, 9 FED. L. REV. 427, 478 (1978); see also Francis Maher, Demise of the Privy Council in the
Australian Judicial Hierarchy, 52 LAW INST. J. 524 (1978); Mason, The Limitation of Appeals,
supra note 80, at 1; Edward St. John, The High Court and the Privy Council; The New Epoch, 50
AUSTL. L.J. 389, 399 (1976).
85. The United Kingdom legislation was passed pursuant to the requests of the Australian
governments (Commonwealth and States), to eliminate appeals from the Australian State Supreme
Courts to the Privy Council under legislation of imperial force. See Australia Act, 1986.
86. In Cook v. Cook, (1986) 162 C.L.R. 376, Justices Mason, Wilson, Deane and Dawson
observed:
The history of this country and of the common law makes it inevitable and desirable that
the courts of this country will continue to obtain assistance and guidance from the
learning and reasoning of United Kingdom courts just as Australian courts benefit from
the learning and reasoning of other great common law courts. Subject, perhaps, to the
special position of decisions of the House of Lords given in the period in which appeals
lay from this country to the Privy Council, the precedents of other legal systems are not
binding and are useful only to the degree of the persuasiveness of their reasoning.
Id. at 390.
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increased confidence of the High Court itself to broaden its perspectives
which might occur as a result of these changes.87
VI. AN UPDATE OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDY
Between the time of the original study of the use of American
precedents by the High Court of Australia (published in 1992) and the
preparation of this paper, a number of developments have occurred which
justify an update of the original study to see whether the original
observations and conclusions remain valid. Two items which particularly
motivated this update were the anecdotal observation of greater use of
concepts from the United States and other countries by the High Court of
Australia and academic discussion pointing to the Australian judiciary as
leaders in expanding intemational perspectives for common law judges.
Whether these observations would be confirmed by empirical evidence was
one matter which warranted further consideration.
8
The original empirical analysis reported above and the conclusions
drawn as a result of that analysis resulted in three broad observations. 89
First, constitutional law and theory represented the largest portion of
American cases cited by the High Court during the period 1900-1910.90
Second, the use of American cases varied in frequency significantly during
the original study period.9 1 Third, recent years have seen a significant
increase of the High Court's use of American cases within a broadening
range of legal areas.9 2
The explanations of the observations that were hypothesized in relation
to the original study period could be classified as those which, at the time,
provided an explanation of historical trends and those which identified
trends likely to continue if the hypothesis were correct. In the former
category are the following conclusions:
87. Sir Anthony Mason, Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia, observed the following in
the 1987 Wilfred Fullager Memorial Lecture at Monash University:
There is, however, every reason why we should fashion a common law for Australia that
is best suited to our conditions and circumstances. In deciding what is law in Australia
we should derive such assistance as we can from English authorities. But this does not
mean that we should account for every English judicial decision as if it were a decision of
an Australian court. The value of English judgments, like Canadian, New Zealand and
for that matter United States judgments, depends on the persuasive force of their
reasoning.
See Sir A.F. Mason, Future Directions in Australian Law, 13 MONASH U.L. REv. 149, 154 (1987).
This was also reported in von Nessen, supra note 11, at 218 n.8 1.
88. For background to the summary provided here in Part VI, see von Nessen, supra note 11, at
217-18.
89. Id. at 194; see also discussion supra notes 66-87 and accompanying text.
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1. The decrease in references to American cases from the 1920s is
attributable to the acceptance by the High Court in 1920 (in
Engineers)93  that Australian jurisprudence (particularly
Constitutional jurisprudence) was more appropriately guided by
British than by United States practice;
2. The failure of the High Court to consider American precedents
prior to the 1970s was partially attributable to a more traditional
Australian view about the role of the judiciary (accepting as
appropriate a less activist role of the judiciary compared to that
accepted for the American judiciary). Both the more limited scope
in Australia for consideration of extraneous evidence to assist in
statutory interpretation and the absence of a Bill of Rights
comparable to the American one were contributing factors; and
3. The disregard by the High Court of American constitutional
authority in the 1940s, 50s and 60s can be partially attributed to the
United States Supreme Court's acceptance of greater federal power,
partially in response to the pressure from President Roosevelt
during the 1930s, and partially due to changes arising from change
of personnel94 at that time.
In the latter category, (identifying trends likely to continue) are the
following conclusions, for which further empirical observations would be
likely to provide further confirmation:
1. The increased Australian reference to United States cases in the
period from 1970 to 1990 was attributable to the elimination of
appeals from the High Court of Australia to the Privy Council in
197595 and the elimination of all appeals to the Privy Council from
Australia in 1986.96 These changes meant that the High Court, as
93. Amalgamated Soc'y of Eng'rs v. Adelaide S.S. Co. (1920) 28 C.L.R. 129, 146-47.
94. Alpheus Thomas Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone and FDR's Court Plan, 61 YALE L.J. 791, 796,
816 (1952); RONALD ROTUNDA, ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND
PROCEDURE 62,284 (1986).
95. Privy Council (Appeals from the High Court Act) 1975 (Austl.); see also Privy Council
(Limitation of Appeals) Act 1968 (Austl.).
96. Australia (Request and Consent) Act 1985 (Austl.); Australia Acts (Request) Act 1985
(Austi.); Australia Act 1986 (U.K.).
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the final court of appeal for Australia,97 could exercise greater
independence .... 98; and
2. In conjunction with the above, the increased use of American
authority by the High Court since 1970 was attributable not only to
the structural change mentioned, but also to the enhanced status of
the High Court. This enhanced status of the High Court (being
since 1986 the court ultimately responsible for the interpretation and
development of Australian law) has provided it with increased
confidence to explore a broader group of legal solutions as
alternatives to the conventional British-dominated evolution of the
common law in the development of a legal system and laws
appropriately adapted to the Australian experience.
While the elimination of appeals to the Privy Council would clearly
enable the High Court to consider a broader range of case authority than
might formerly have been possible, the frequency and volume of references
by the High Court of Australia to the opinions of foreign courts would
provide evidence not only of the level of confidence the High Court displays
in the task of developing and applying law as adapted to Australian
conditions, but also of its comfort with the use of such authority as well. To
ascertain whether the observations and conclusions originally made were
still valid thirteen years later (a significantly longer period than the period
within the original study, which occurred after the constitutional changes in
1986), an update of the empirical study of 1990 was undertaken to ascertain
whether the observations then observed continued to be valid and whether
the conclusions drawn from those observations were likely to be sustained.
VII. USE OF AMERICAN PRECEDENTS REVISITED EMPIRICALLY
The updated 1990 study relied almost exclusively on citation analysis,
employing a basic empirical approach to identify the trends which are
summarized above. As outlined in full detail in the original study, the data
at the time was developed through physical observations of the
Commonwealth Law Reports, noting references to American authority (with
greater or lesser difficulty, depending upon the changing style of footnote
presentations during the years). Guided by other studies of the period, the
original work was intended to make observations with as little subjective
judgment as possible.
In the time between the original study and this revisit, there have been
many developments which have affected the methodology employed in the
97. See Viro v. The Queen (1978) 141 C.L.R. 88; see also Geddes, supra note 84; Maher, supra
note 84; Mason, The Limitation ofAppeals, supra note 80; St. John, supra note 84.
98. von Nessen, supra note 11, at 217; see also Cook v. Cook (1986) C.L.R. 376, 390.
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citation analysis update. For this reason, a strict comparison of the results of
the original study and this update would not be scientifically appropriate.
Nevertheless, even with a change in methodology, it was hoped that this
update could confirm whether the trends identified in the original study were
continuing.
Since the completion of the original study, there have been numerous
changes to legal reporting and research. The arrival of computer-based legal
research has meant that research techniques like the one originally employed
will most likely be included within a group described as peculiar to that era.
One might even assert that the great expansion in the use of empirical
studies which commenced in the 1980s in the United States and expanded
around the world in later years could be attributable to the fact that
computerized research facilitates such studies.
To update the findings of the original study to the year 2002, a search
was undertaken of the full text High Court databases of the Commonwealth
Law Reports through Lawbook online. The Lawbook database was used in
preference to the Lexis Butterworths or other full text databases (such as
AustLII, the Australian Legal Information Institute's database) due to the
use of the Commonwealth Law Reports in the original study.99 The
importance of ascertaining the context of "hits" in a search for case authority
from the United States will quickly become apparent when the technique
that was employed is described. To maintain an element of consistency to
the original study, the footnotes of each of the reported cases were also
reviewed.
The databaset 0 was searched for the law reports (by volume) which
serve the United States, both federally and for the various states, in order to
find citations to United States authority. The federal search terms used
included "U.S." (for the official reporter of the United States Supreme
Court), "F. Supp." (for the Federal Supplement, the reporter for the Federal
District Courts) and "F." (for the Federal Reporter, the reporter for the
99. Although I originally undertook the updated study on the Lexis Nexis database, I was
convinced by Professor Maxwell King, Deputy Dean of the Monash Faculty of Business and
Economics (former Head of Econometrics and Business Statistics), that the methodology between
the two studies should be as indistinguishable as possible despite the differences in time and
medium. The use of the electronic database was essentially the same as the physical review
undertaken thirteen years ago with the added advantage of the electronic highlighting of 'hits.' The
process of reviewing references on the electronic database was also made less difficult by the
collection of all footnotes in the electronic version of the Commonwealth Law Reports.
100. During the control comparison discussed supra note 64, the same process was applied to a
sample number of cases throughout the period.
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Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals)10 1 . This process unfortunately resulted
in numerous hits which did not relate to a reporter citation from the United
States (which were culled by direct observation of the search results).
Additionally, this search process did not reveal references to reports using
unconventional citation style. The High Court's citation of United States
authority has become more consistent and conventional in recent years in
comparison to the style observed in the early years of the twentieth century
(particularly in relation to the reports of judgments from the American
states). For this reason, it was necessary to perform a search for the
"unofficial" United States Supreme Court reporter citations; those produced
by West Publishing ("S. Ct."), the Lawyers Cooperative ("L. Ed.") and
United States Law Week ("U.S.L.W.") were included in the search (using
the citation style employed in the Commonwealth Law Reports. These
citations were revised to eliminate duplications from the use of parallel
citations for one case.
The difficulty encountered in finding citations of opinions of the federal
courts of the United States in the High Court database proved minimal in
comparison to the search for citations of American state authorities.
Utilizing the same technique, search terms were employed to find references
to the regional reporters of the United States' West system. West Publishing
groups the judgments of the appellate courts of the American states into
seven regional reporter series. The seven series of reports include the North
Eastern, North Western, South Eastern and South Western reporters
(represented by the easily searched and relatively unique abbreviations
"N.E .... N. W.," "S.E.," and "S.W."). The remaining three regional series,
Atlantic, Southern and Pacific, caused the greatest difficulty, being
abbreviated to the ubiquitous letters "A.," "So.," and "P." When reviewing
the footnotes of the cases included within the electronic database of the
Commonwealth Law Reports, there were infrequent observations of cases
reported in state reporters without the parallel citation to the West Regional
Reporters. These rare occurrences were, for purposes of the updated study,
included in the appropriate region.
The database revealed citations within cases decided by the High Court
between 1991 and 2002.102 The results of this process were summarized and
divided into two time periods: 1991-2000 and 2000-2001. The results of
these observations are as follows:
101. THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 193 tbl. T.1 (Columbia Law Review
Ass'n et al. eds., 18th ed. 2005).
102. This database now covers all Commonwealth Law Reports from volume I to volume 212.
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High Court Citations of United States Authority
1991-2002
United States (U.S.) 1293 424
L. Ed., S. Ct., U.S.L.W. 46 2
Federal (F.) 337 142
Federal Supplement (F. Supp.) 60 94
Atlantic (A.) 69 11
North Eastern (N.E.) 105 39
North Western (N.W.) 30 12
Pacific (P.) 88 25
Southern (So.) 13 10
South Eastern (S.E.) 38 13
South Western (S.W.) 32 9
Total 2111 620
No analysis was undertaken to draw any statistical relationships or
conclusions about the reporter series in which the United States cases
appear. 10 3 Outside the purview of this updated study is the question of why
certain regions of the United States appear more frequently than others.
While the identification of particular courts or state systems as influential
has been the subject of study in the United States,10 4 an intuitive explanation
would be that the location of major United States financial, commercial and
cultural centers is reflected in the vibrant legal culture which developed to
serve those centers.
The above observations confirm that the use of United States authority
by the High Court of Australia has continued unabated since the original
study occurred, and at an increasingly frequent rate even by comparison to
the 1980s. The period 1991-2000 saw approximately 211.1 citations per
year. The two year period 2001-2002, though a smaller sample, presented
103. Considering the United States judicial framework, it would be far more likely that United
States Supreme Court citations would predominate in constitutional and public law issues, with State
decisions predominating in common law analysis. The study findings, though not presented, are
consistent with that view.
104. Studies have been undertaken in the United States about the influence of the various state
supreme courts within that country. See generally Friedman et al., supra note 18. One might
assume that a court's influence on international jurists would be attributable to similar reasons as
those found within the United States itself.
917
an average rate of citations of nearly 310 per year. By contrast, similar total
citations in the period 1981-1990 showed an average of 109.6 citations per
year. °5 Even this figure was nearly double that of the 56.5 citations per year
in next highest decade in the original study (1901-1910).
Graph 6
Annual American Citations by High Court, 1901-2002
400 -- Projected from two year
200 - average 2001-02
0 ---- Actual 1901-2000
The observation of the types of cases in which precedent from the
United States was used was also considered. In the most recent study, the
findings of citations by topic area were as follows:
Citation by Topics
1991-2002
Period Total Con Pub Com Tort Crim CL SL Misc
Cites
1991-2000 2111 745 125 125 333 221 152 257 153
Percentage 35.3 5.9 5.9 15.8 10.5 7.2 12.2 7.2
2001-2002 620 109 22 75 145 19 42 165 46
Percentage __ _17.6 3.5 12.1 22.9 3.1 6.8 22.6 7.4
In the original study, the citation of United States authority varied from
decade to decade as indicated in the following table (supplemented with the
findings from 1991-2000 and 2001-2002):
105. Even when supplemented by the study in 2002, this average remained quite constant, with
the actual average citations per year for the period 1981-1990 being 109.6 citations per year rather
than the 111 estimated at the time of the original study. See supra note 56.
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Table of Topics
Decades 1901-1990, Supplemented By 1991-2002
Total
Decade Con Pub Com Tort Crim CL SL MiscCites
1901-1910 565 71.5% 8.1% 4.1% 1.2% 1.6% 4.0% 8.3% 1.2%
1911-1920 474 71.9 9.7 2.3 4.6 0.5 6.3 3.4 1.3
1921-1930 273 74.4 2.2 7.7 2.9 0.0 10.3 1.8 0.7
1931-1940 269 48.3 2.6 6.0 13.4 2.6 8.2 16.7 2.2
1941-1950 366 77.6 7.9 1.6 0.0 1.9 4.4 3.0 3.6
1951-1960 296 64.2 7.5 1.3 14.2 1.0 10.5 1.0 0.3
1961-1970 190 50.0 7.4 3.2 19.4 4.2 7.4 8.4 0.0
1971-1980 329 27.9 15.8 3.6 3.0 9.1 27.3 5.2 7.9
1981-1990 1096 33.7 10.7 3.4 2.8 12.2 34.9 5.1 0.3
Total 3,858 54.7 8.8 3.5 5.0 5.2 15.6 5.5 1.7
1901-1990 1
1991-2000 2111 35.3 5.9 5.9 15.8 10.5 7.2 12.2 7.2
2001-2002 620 17.6 3.5 12.1 22.9 3.1 6.8 22.6 7.4
Total1901-2002 6,589 45.0 7.4 5.1 10.1 6.7 12.1 9.6 4.0
The updated study indicated that the use of United States authority by
the High Court was more consistent with the practice revealed in the 1981-
1990 period than with any other period, with the proportion of constitutional
cases continuing to decrease in a manner consistent with the original study.
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As a corollary of the reduction in constitutional cases, the number of
common law and statutory law cases in which United States authority has
been used has continued to increase (although the proportions among the
various categories thereof show few discernable trends). 10 6 The following
chart indicates both the change of mix and the increase in frequency of use
of United States citations (2001-2002 are not included).
106. The primary increase during this last period is in the area of miscellaneous. This is largely
attributable to the inclusion of the numerous native title cases within this area.
920
[Vol. 33: 883, 2006] The Australian Experience
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Graph 8









3¢ ~ ~ ~~~~% %, ,q  N ,,q . q 0¢- x Constitutional
VIII. CONCLUSIONS IN 2002: MODIFICATIONS TO THE ORIGINAL
OBSERVATIONS
The empirical study performed through 1990 and the study undertaken
this year confirm that the High Court has continued to consider authority
from the United States in an increasingly broad range of topic areas since
1975. Of particular interest in the context of common law systems is the
consideration of United States authority by the High Court in the areas of
judicially-made law (common law) such as contracts and torts, where
foreign innovations have not received the imprimatur of legislative action in
Australia. Additionally, increasing use of authority from the United States
can be seen in those areas of the law which relate to human rights and
international obligations.
10 7
Commentators from Australia and abroad attribute this increase in
Australia and in equivalent common law nations as arising from two distinct,
yet inter-related developments: the elimination of appeals to the Privy
Council10 8 and the relaxation by the ultimate court of appeal in most
common law countries (in equivalent positions to the High Court of
Australia) of the requirement to adhere strictly to their own previous
authority. 10 9  Both of these developments have encouraged broader
perspectives in the development of national law.
107. See, e.g., Polyukhovich v. Commonwealth (1991) 172 C.L.R. 501.
108. See discussion supra note 38 and accompanying text.
109. See discussion supra notes 30-39 and accompanying text.
The revisited study also provides two interesting, yet related specific
observations which indicate that the High Court's judicial attitudes have
changed, perhaps as a result of the above-mentioned structural changes. The
first observation is that there is a continued use of United States authority in
constitutional cases considered by the High Court of Australia.1 10 Many of
the United States cases considered in constitutional law during the last
decade, however, relate to implied rights found within the Australian
Constitution."' The acceptance of such rights by implication has meant that
much American constitutional jurisprudence is now relevant to Australia in a
way which may not have been anticipated only ten years ago. A second
specific observation, mentioned above, is that United States authority in
relation to newly developing subject areas, such as native title".2 and
immigration law,' has proved to be quite useful to the High Court.
One might be tempted to assert that the High Court's use of United
States authority is best explained by the fact that in such developing areas of
law there is little or no established Australian or British jurisprudence. An
alternative, equally plausible explanation is one that comparative law might
provide: that as globally common issues arise, consideration of the broadest
range of potential solutions and approaches to these common problems is not
only permissible, but advisable.
The empirical citation analysis from the updated study confirms that the
use of United States authority by the High Court of Australia continues to
increase. This observation, taken alone, does not fully establish whether this
is attributable to an acceptance of comparative law or of international
perspectives by the High Court of Australia. The empirical evidence is
consistent with the conclusion that the High Court now accepts the value of
a global perspective, and that this sustains the increased use of United States
authority. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence can only provide one
element in the establishment of the benefit of comparative law in the
development of Australian jurisprudence.
The use of foreign law as a tool to aid in the development of local law is
becoming more common throughout the world, and the methods by which
national courts use foreign authority has been the subject of numerous
studies. 14 While reference to foreign law has proceeded apace in many
110. See discussion supra Part VII.
111. See, e.g., Australian Capital Territory Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth (1992) 177
C.L.R. 106; Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd. (1994) 182 C.L.R. 104; Lange v.
Australian Broad. Corp. (1997) 189 C.L.R. 520; Levy v. Victoria (1997) 189 C.L.R. 579; Roberts v.
Bass, (2002) 212 C.L.R. 1.
112. Mabo v. Queensland (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1; Fejo v. N. Territory (1998) 156 A.L.R. 721;
Yannerv. Eaton (1999)201 C.L.R. 351; Commonwealthv. Yarmirr (2001) 208 C.L.R. 1.
113. E.g., Minister of State for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh (1995) 183 C.L.R. 273.
114. See, e.g., THE USE OF COMPARATIVE LAW BY COURTS 25-333 (Ulrich Drobing & Sjef Van
Erp eds., 1999) (containing a collection of national reports).
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countries, the methodology by which such foreign law is judged as
appropriate for local use has remained relatively undeveloped: "most courts
which refer to foreign law, be it statutes, court decisions or writings, do not
really undertake a comparison of law, utilizing the methods and standards
applied by academics."
'1 15
Because judges are concerned with resolving specific disputes, it is
understandable that the High Court of Australia has not developed a
systematic and complete comparative methodology to determine whether a
legal solution arrived at in another country should be attempted in Australia.
Throughout the period of this most recent empirical study, the High Court of
Australia has shown a continued willingness to consider foreign law for
possible solutions to be applied in Australia. 116 Many would accept that it
might be inappropriate for a High Court Justice to opine judicially about the
methodology employed when considering the usefulness of foreign law;
however, the academic and professional publications of particular High
Court Justices provide insight into the manner in which such foreign law is
used.
In the development of the methodology by which it considers foreign
law, the High Court of Australia has exhibited a great willingness and an
increasingly sophisticated ability to subject established authority to the test
of foreign alternatives. As stated by Justice Michael Kirby, one of the
greatest adherents of the acceptance of global perspectives on the High
Court:
Increasingly a court such as the High Court of Australia looks
beyond its traditional sources when solving a problem. Its
traditional source was the law of England, and maybe it would look
to Canada and the United States. But now we will take information
from the Supreme Court of India, or the Court of Appeal of New
Zealand, or the Constitutional Court of South Africa. Mainly
English-speaking countries because they tend to be common law
countries and they tend to write their decisions in the English
language. But, where relevant, we will look beyond that. It's a wise
reminder for all of us that the best thoughts, the most creative
thoughts, will come from outside of your magic circle. It's therefore
important to stimulate your mind with analogous reasoning.' 17
115. Ulrich Drobnig, The Use of Comparative Law by Courts, in THE USE OF COMPARATIVE LAW
BY COURTS 4 (Ulrich Drobing & Sjef Van Erp eds., 1999).
116. See discussion supra Part VI.
117. Justice Michael Kirby, Dialogue, Think Globally, 4 GREEN BAG 2d 287, 291 (2001).
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Undoubtedly, the development of Australian law will continue to benefit
from the willingness to consider broader perspectives and foreign solutions.
The High Court's attempts to develop a full comparative methodology to
judge the appropriateness of international solutions that it might employ
should be welcome. For the benefit of Australian law, it is hoped that such
methodological development will become more comprehensive and more
commonly applied in the future. Only then will the full value of broadened
international perspectives be achieved. Undoubtedly, the same arguments
may be made in relation to the United States as well.
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